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• CASE NOTES
aggrieved employee, since the employee is unable to prosecute his own .
claim under the usual collective bargaining agreement . 5
While no
	 decisions have been found in direct conflict with that
of the principal case; yet dictum in Alabama Power Co. v. Haygood,8
 not
cited in the principal case, indicates that the Alabama courts would require
exhaustion of the grievance procedure. It seems unfortunate that the
federal court did not follow that decision.' It is submitted that union secu-
rity- is promoted by requiring. union ' to process their grievances
through the union;i and, that this security generally leads to better union-
company relations. The danger of a union's arbitrarily refusing to process ,
grievances is minimized by dispensing with the requirement when the union
is hostile to the employee's claims.
CHARLES C. WINCHESTER; 'JR.'
Landlord and Tenant—Payment of Increased Taxes on Lessee's Im-
provements—Do-ctrine 'of 'Waste—Tbe Crew Corp. v. Feiler.'=The
plaintiff leased premises for a term of fifteen years with an option to buy
in the lessee. By the terms of the lease, the lessor agreed to ' pay municipal
real estate taxes. There was no express provision authorizing the leSsee
to' 'make 'alterations or iinProvementS. Scion 'after the execution of the lease,
the lessee made certain improvements to the building, changing its charac:
teristics from an industrial to an office building, as a result of which' the
valuation of the property was increased, resulting in increased taxes in
the amount of $2,700. The .lessor brought suit against the lessee to recover
the amount:paid' in increased taxes. The Trial Court granted summary
judgment fOr the lessee. The Appellate biVision of the Superior Court
affirmed and on appeal the Supreme Court of New Jersey reversed and re-
manded. HELD: That while the parties are free to make whatever agree-
ment they please, ad'Unqualified covenant to pay real estate taxes means
that the covenantor is required to make tax payments based on (1) the
value of the leased premises as they existed at the time of the Tease, and
(2) such increases in value as reflect improvement made by the lessee under
the authority of the lease or authority of law. Since as a matter of con-
struction the improvements were not authorized by the lease, the question
was whether they were authorized by law. In answering this question in
the negative the court found that the lessee's acts constituted waste and,
therefore, were not performed under authority of law.
• In reaching its decision, the first problem with which the court was
faced was to ascertain the intent of the parties through a construction of
the covenant to pay taxes. In this respect where the lease is silent as to
5 Alabama Power Co. v. Haygood, 266 Ala. 194, 95 So.2d 98 (1957) ; Jorgenson v.
Pennsylvania R.R. Co., supra note 4; Pattenge v. Wagner Iron Works, 275 Wis. 495,
82 N.W.2d 172 (1957); United Protective Workers of America v. Ford Motor Co., 194
F.2d 997, 1002 (7th Cir., 1952).
6 266 Ala. 194, 95 So.2d 98 (1957).
1 28 N,J. 316, 146 A.2d 458 (1958).
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the right of the lessee to make improvements, it is logical to conclude that
it was not within the purview of a convenant to pay taxes, that the lessor-
covenantor should pay increased taxes on the building's enhanced value
which resulted from the lessee's alterations made in violation of the cove-
nantor's rights. But, quaere, whether when improvements are made by the
lessee which are not in violation of the lessor's rights, an unqualified cove-
nant by the lessee to pay taxes should be read as a promise to pay increased
taxes due to the increased value of the property resulting from improve-
ments made by the lessee under the authority of law or to pay only such taxes
as represent the value of the premises as of the time of the lease? It appears
that the reading given to the covenant by the court is most reasonable and
in keeping, with the general rule of contract - construction that the language
of a covenant should be construed most strongly against the party who uses
it.2
Once this construction has been given to the covenant to pay taxes, it
then becomes necessary to apply the doctrine of waste in order to ascertain
whether the improvements were made in violation of the lessor-covenantor's
rights. Under the Statute of Gloucesters a person owning less than a free-
hold estate could not legally do any act which would result in a permanent
injury to the freehold. An action of waste was maintainable under which
the owner of the fee was entitled to terminate the lease and recover treble
damages. In the United States most jurisdictions have enacted legislation
modelled after this Statute.' However, neither the Statute of Gloucester
nor its American counterparts define the acts which constitute waste.
In earlier decisions, the courts held that the freeholder was entitled
to receive his property back in substantially the same condition as when
leased and, therefore, any act which resulted in a material change in the
nature or character of the premises constituted waste. It was immaterial
whether the property was improved or its value enhanced. 5 Under modern
law, however, there exists a tendency to modify the traditional concept,
especially where the lessee makes a material change in the condition of the
property but does not diminish its value. An example of this is found
in New York where, by statute, a tenant may improve the property under
designated conditions, without the consent of the owner.° However, some
2 Indiana Natural Gas & Oil Co. v. Hinton, 159 Ind. 398, 64 N.E. 224 (1902).
3 1278, 6 Edw. 1, c. 8, § 3. The predecessor of the Statute of Gloucester was the
Statute of Marlbridge, 1267, 52 Hen. 3, c. 23.
4 See, N.J.S.A. Tit. 2A: 65-2 for the New Jersey statute. In about twenty-one
states the statutes permit the recovery of multiple damages by the owner of the fee. In
about eighteen states there are provisions for forfeiture of the estate. Many statutes omit
elements of the Statute of Gloucester and others combine various elements so that one
must look to the statutes of the particular jurisdiction in order to determine the state
of the law. For example, Mass. C.L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 202, §§ 1 & 4 provide for the recovery
of damages and forfeiture of the estate, but do not permit the recovery of multiple
damages except if waste is committed by a joint tenant or tenant in common.
5 Tiffany, Real Property § 636 (2d ed. 1939).
6 N.Y. Real Property Law, § 537 provides that a tenant for a term of five years
or more, may make those alterations that a reasonably prudent owner in fee simple
would make provided he posts a bond and does not decrease the market value of the
remainderman's interest.
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courts have difficulty in formulating a clear concept of waste, and as a re-
sult, they leave the question to the fact finder to decide as a matter
of fact whether the acts complained of constitute waste in the light of all
the attendant circumstances? The fact finder is required to take into con-
sideration obsolescence, change in conditions, increase or decrease in market
value, injury to freehold, prejudice to remainderman and any other circum-
stance which might have a bearing on the decision.
In The Crew Corporation v. Fetter, the court adopted the view that to
constitute waste it is necessary that an act be done to the property which
is prejudicial to the interest of the remainderman. This is in keeping with
the liberalized view, yet it has an advantage over that approach which
leaves the determination to the fact finder in that it furnishes a definite
standard to apply to the facts. 8
 In employing this test in the Feller case,
the court found that the alterations which resulted in an increased tax
burden on the lessor, considered together with the option to buy in the
lessee prejudiced the lessor's interest in the premises because, if the lessor
wanted to sell his interest, its present value would be depressed by the les-
sening of his rental income as a result of the increased taxes.
RICHARD H. JENSEN
Restraint of Trade—Robinson-Patman Act—Indirect Price Discrimi-
nation.—Ludwig v. American Greetings Corporation.'—An anti
-trust
action to recover treble damages was brought under § 4 of the Clayton
Act2 by a competitor against a greeting card manufacturer and distributor
for an alleged violation of § 2 of the Clayton Act as amended by the
Robinson-Patman Act.3 The District Court (N. D. Ohio E. D.) sustained
defendant's motion for judgment, and the plaintiff appealed. The Court
of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, Miller, J., reversed, holding the allegations
of plaintiff's complaint sufficient in that the action of the defendant in
placing former retail customers of the plaintiff on a consignment basis in
order to induce such customers to transfer their business to defendant
constituted a prima facie case of indirect price discrimination. 4
The problem which seemed to cause the greatest difficulty in the
District Court was whether the plaintiff, as a competitor, had standing to
sue under the treble damages provision of the Clayton Act as amended by
the Robinson-Patman Act. The judge decided that the remedies were avail-
able only to consumers, and not to competitors. This position was rejected
7 See, Melms v. Pabst Co., 100 Wis. 7, 79 N.W. 738, 46 L.R.A. 478 (1899).
This view has found favor in other jurisdictions also. For example, see Pynchon
v. Stearns, 52 Mass. (11 Mete.) 304 (1846).
1 264 F.2d 286 (6th Cir. 1959).
2 15 U.S.C. 15.
3 15 U.S.C. 1 13.
4 It should be noted that this case does not hold that selling on consignment to a
competitor's customers is indirect price discrimination; it merely holds that it is a prima
facie case of such discrimination.
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